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Summary findings
Pcrhiaps  the major accomplishment  of the Uruguay  Whether they can maintain a viable  textilc and clothing
Itound is agreemenits  reached on nontariff harriers  export  sector depends on whether they can achieve
(NTBs).  All NTBs imposed under the Multifibcr  reforms aimcd at cost-cutting.  The MFA liberalization  is
Arrangement (MFA)  will be phased out over 10  years,  heavily  backloaded,  with roughly half the restrictions
and all -voluntary" export rcstraints will bc abolished.  being removed at the end  of 10 years, so therc is ampic
OECD  countrics' NTBs on agricultural  goods will be  time for adjustment.
converted to tariffs and then reduced by an average of 36  Africa should also face more vigorous  competition on
pcrcent. Agrcemcnt  was also rcached on limiting  footwear and ferrous metals  when "voluntary"  restraints
subsidies  and other agricultural export incentives.  on some other developing  countries are lifted. Any losses
As a result, the profile of OECD nontariff protection  in market share that may occur, however, may not reflect
Africa faces  will change dramatically.  Formerly,  about 1  1  welfare changes, especially  if African  exports were
percent of all Sub-Saharan  African  exports encounrcred  heavily  subsidized.
NTBs; now this ratio will fall to about 2 percent.  Agriculture  could also be harmed unless appropriate
Formerly, 83 percent of Reunion's pre-Uruguay  Round  domestic policies  are adopted. The tariffication (and
exports were affected by NTBs; now none will.  reduction) of NTBs, along with limits  on export
Some African  countries, howevcr, will be largely  subsidies,  could raise international prices on some
unaffected by the Uruguay  Round's acconiplishments.  staples,  which would hurt net food importers. Reforms
No NlTBs  on energy products were liberalized  so  to ensure that prices paid to domestic  producers incrcase
coverage  ratios for Angola, Congo, and Nigeria are still  in line with international prices (thus stimulating  a local
high - but the measures applied (largely  quantitative  supply response) could limit increases  in the food import
restrictions and special  import charges)  apparently do  bill. In the post-Uruguay  Round world, it is increasingly
not raise the cost of imports significantly.  The exclusion  important to remove domestic constraints that prevent
of fish from the agreement on agricu'ture also limited  the  local producers from taking full advantage  of new export
potential benefits to countries like  the Seychelles.  Others  opportunities.
simply faced no (or few) nontariff restrictions  before the  "Unfinished business"  includes  further initiatives
negotiations.  needed to address NTBs on fish, chemicals,  and energy
The new developments  are regarded as positive for  products, which the Round bypassed.  Stricter regulations
developing  countries as a group, although some countries  on safeguards  and the use of antidumping  duties are also
may incur losses.  needed to ensure that these measures  are not substituted
Trade in textiles and clothing has been closely  for those eliminated.  But much of the unfinished business
regulated for three decades through MFA  quotas.  involves  domestic reform needed to ensure that African
Phasing  these restrictions  out will subject African  countries can react to new export opportunities and
countries to aggressive  international competition.  competitive challenges.
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the departnr.t. to identify  factors  affecting  the export earnings  of developing  countries  and to anticipate  important  changes  that
may  occur.  Copicsof  the paper  are available  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please  contact
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Perhaps the major accomplishment  of the Uruguay  Round relates to agreements  reached  on
nontariff  barriers. All  NTBs  imposed  under  the Multifiber  Arrangement  (MFA)  will be phased  out over
a ten year  period  and all "voluntary"  export  restraints  will also  be abolished. OECD  countries'  nontariff
barriers  on agricultural  goods  will be converted  to tariffs  and then  reduced  by an average  of 36 percent.
Agreement  was also reached  on limiting  subsidies  and other agricultural  export  incentives.
As a result of these achievements  the profile  of OECD  nontariff  protection  facing  Africa will
change  dramatically.  Formerly,  about  11  percent  of all sub-Saharan  Africa's  exports  encountered  NTBs  -
- this  ratio will fall to about  3 percent. For some  African  countries  the changes  will be dranatic.  Pre-
Uruguay  Round  NTBs  covered  more  than  60 percent  of Mauritius'  exports  - this ratio will fall to about
2 percent.  Formerly, 83 percent  of Reunion's exports faced NTBs and this ratio will drop to zero.
However,  some  African  countries  will be largely  unaffected  by the Uruguay  Round's  accomplishments.
No NTBs  on energy  products  were liberalized  so the coverage  ratios for Angola,  Congo and Nigeria
remain relatively  high.  However,  the measures  which are applied  (largely QRs and special import
charges)  generally  do not  appear  to have  a major cost raising  impact  on imports.  Exclusion  of fish  from
the agreement  on agriculture  also limited  the potential  benefits  to counties  like the Seychelles. Others
simply  faced  no (or few)  nontariff  restrictions  prior to the negotiations.
While there is a (correct)  tendency  to regard these developments  as being positive  from the
viewpoint  of developing  countries  as a group, some individual  ones  may incur  losses. Trade in textiles
and clothing  has been closely  regulated  over the last three decades  through  quotas imposed  under the
Multifiber  Arrangement.  The phase  out  of these  restrictions  will subject  African  countries'  to aggressive
intemational  competition.  The ability  of many  African  countries  to maintain  a viable  textile  and clothing
export sector depends on their capacity to implement  necessary  reforms aimed at achieving  cost
competitiveness.  The fact that  the MFA liberalization  is so heavily  backloaded  (roughly  one-half  of the
restrictions  will be removed  at the end of a ten year period)  provides  ample  time  for adjustment.  Africa
should  also face more  vigorous  competition  on products  like footwear  and ferrous  metals  where  exports
from some other developing  countries  were formerly  restrained  by "voluntary"  restraints  which were
eliminated. The market  share  losses  which  could  occur, however,  may  not be an accurate  indication  as
to the importance  of welfare  changes  - especially  if African  exports  were heavily  subsidized.
Some Uruguay  Round  effects  in agriculture  could also  be adverse  unless  appropriate  domestic
policies  are adopted. The tariffication  (and reduction)  of NTBs,  along  with limits  on export subsidies,
could  raise international  prices of some  important  staples  which  would  have adverse  effects  on African
net food importers.  Reforms  to ensure that prices paid to domestic  producers increase  in line with
international  prices (thereby  stimulating  a local supply  response)  could  limit increases  in the food  import
bill. The removal  of domestic  constraints  that  prevent  local  producers  from taking  full advantage  of new
export  opportunities  has clearly  assumed  increased  importance  in the post-Uruguay  Round  world.
As far as "unfinished"  business  is concerned,  further initiatives  are needed  to address  NTBs  on
energy  products, fish and chemicals  which  were bypassed  by the Round. Also, stricter  regulations  On
the  use of antidumping  duties  and  safeguards  are required  to ensure  that  these  measures  are not  substituted
for those  that were eliminated. However,  a very large  part of the unfinished  business  involves  reforms
in the African countries themselves  to ensure they can react to the new export opportunities  and
competitive  challenges  resulting  from the Uruguay  Round.I. Introduction
Economists  are in generai agreement  that expanded export opportunities  can provide an important
stimulus to developing countries' industrialization  and growth.  For example, Helleiner (1972), Keesing
(1967) and Meier (1968) draw on economic  theory to shcv how increased exports can accelerate growth
through: (i) learning effects from the developmen of new products,  lechnologies  and information  sources;
(ii) opportunities to achieve scale economies that could not be achieved in many developing countries
relatively small domestic markets; (iii) benefits from linkages  between export industries and other sectors;
(iv) weakening of monopoly elements that may affect foreign trade which, in turn, would result in more
favorable import and export prices; or  (v) less reliance on (relatively unstable) exports of primary
conunodities whose price fluctuations may make development planning difficult.  Nunerous  empirical
studies (see  among others  Balassa 1977,  1984, Kravis  1970) document the  superior  growth and
industrialization  rates achieved by developing countries that adopted policies allowing them to capitalize
on opportunities to expand exports.'
In spite of the potentially important  positive affects attributed to increased  exports, it is sometimes
'Meier (1968,  Chapter  7) provides  a useful  review  of arguments  advanced  in support  of outward  oriented  as
opposed  to import  substitutionpolicies.  Key  elements  of the laner  often  center  on the  promotion  of infant  industries,
or efforts  to reduce  expenditures  of limited  foreign  exchange. See  Yeats  (1979,  Chapter  2) or Little,  Scitovsky  and
Schott  (1970)  for further  assessments  of import  substitution  policies.argued that trade restrictions in OECD markets may significantly reduce the capacity of developing
countries to effectively pursue trade related growth strategies. 2 Given the importance that has been
attached to the potential negative impact  of developed countries' trade barriers, this study evaluates what
the Uruguay Round achieved in the liberalization of these measures and what still remains to be done.
Two points conceming  this study's orientation should be noted. First, the focus is on Sub-Saharan  Africa
due to the below average growth and export performance of this region. 3 The analysis attempts to
determine whether  OECD trade barriers are in any way responsible.  Second, the analysis concentrates
on the Uruguay Round's accomplishments  in liberalizing  nontariff barriers facing African exports.  This
focus is the result of studies (Erzan and  Svedberg 1991 and  Yeats  1994) showing Africa receives
important  OECD tariff concessions  under the Lome Convention, Generalized System of Preferences, or
Least Developed Country Preferences that provide more favorable terms of market access than that for
most of their competitors' products.
The study proceeds as follows.  First, detailed information on the composition and direction of
African exports is examined  to identify markets and products that should be given special attention.  An
attempt is then made to determine which African countries and products were most heavily affected by
pre-Uruguay Round nontariff barriers and how this situation changed as a result of the multilateral trade
negotiations. The possibility that some elements of the Uruguay Round agreement on NTBs may have
negative effects on African countries is also considered.  The study closes with an assessment of the
2For example,  the Commonwealth  Secretariat  (1982, p. 61) stated "Protectionist  measures  (in industrial
countries)  discriminate  against  developing  countries.  For not only has it been on the products  in which these
countries  are primarily  interested  that most  of the  new  quantitative  restrictions  havc  been  imposed,  but it is also the
developing  countries  (especially  the poorer  ones)  which  have  suffered  most. The  most  important  restrictions,  as far
as developing  countries  are concerned,  have  been  on textiles  and clothing;  exports  of this  group  of products  are so
significant  for these  countries,  and increasingly  so for the poorer  and smaller  ones,  that they  regard  developments
under the umbrella of the MFA as a barometer of developed country attitudes towards protectionism in general.
Their experience  in this respect  has been  discouraging.
3UNCTAD  (1993)  reports  that world  trade  grew  at an annual  rate of 6 percent  over  the decade  1980-1990.  yet
the exports  of sub-Saharan  African  countries  actually  dediined  by 2.1 percent  per year over that same  interval.
Statistics  in the UNCTAD  report  also show  that  African  exponz  are more  concentrated  in primary  commodities  than
are exports  from most  other  developing  countries.3
policies Africa should adopt to avoid these adverse effects.
11.  The Composition and Direction of African Exports
Analyses of the direction of trade shows that  major short or  medium-term changes in  the
destinations of a country's exports, or the origins of its imports, do not frequently occur (see UNCTAD,
1992 and other years). Finance,  commercial,  transport  and other logistical  problems are preventive  factors,
as are distance to alternative  markets or cultural elements like language differences (Safadi, Primo-Braga
and Yeats, 1994). This point indicates one should focus on trade barriers in markets that are presently
the major destinations of African exports since they will, in all likelihood, continue to be of major
importance within the foreseeable  future.'
Table I provides statistics on the value and share of individual African country's exports going
to  all developed and developing countries as well as selected regional groups of importeas.  Trade
weighted totals for all sub-SahaTan  Africa are given, see the memo item, along with similar statistics for
all developing countries. The latter is provided to show the extent to which Africa's direction of trade
differs from that of most developing countries. 5 Caution is warranted regarding these comparisons,
however, since it is generally accepted that some intra-African  trade is unrecorded.
4For  example,  North-South  liner  conference  routes  are one factor  constraining  major  short-term  trade  changes.
The direction  of established  shipping  routes  are such  that many  developing  countries  often  have  direct  access  to a
relatively  few OECD  markets  and tiiat efforts to trade with others often involve  costly transshipment  through
wayports. The transport  bamers  to increased  African  intra-trade  appear  even more  imposing. Yeats  (1983)  found
some African  countries  had to ship goods  to some European  port, off-load  the product,  and then  re-export  it back
in order  to trade with some  other  sub-Saharan  countries.
5Numerous  "structure-perfornance"  studies  of industrial  countries'  domestic  markets  show a common  pattem
exists.  When aggressive  inter-finn competition  is absent consumers  are penalized  by having  to pay higher
(monopoly)  prices,  while  other  finn performance  measures  are lower (poorer)  than they are in mor  competitive
markets (See Bain 1951, Bell and Murphy 1969, or Mann 1966 for illustrative  examples  of this research).
Subsequent  empirical  studies  have also shown  that these  conclusions  also apply  to international  markets. That is.
a country  is likely to receive  a lower  price for its exports,  and to pay a higher  price  for its imports,  if aggressive
competition  is absent  from  its foreign  trade sector  (See Avramovitc  1978,  Edward  1972,  Heldiner 1978,  or Yeats
1981).Table 1. The Geographk Destinations  of Sub-Saharan African Countries' Expoils; 1991  or Latest Year Avaiable.
.________  Major  Crographic  Destsnations  (%)
of which:  of whicb:
World  Developed  Eastern  Socialist  Devkirpaig
Exporing  Country  (S  million)  Countries  North  Europe  Asia  Countries  Developng
Europe  America  Japan  Others  Africa
Angola  3,105.4  78.1  25.1  52.6  0.1  0.3  0.8  0.1  20.8  15
Benin  49.1  74.7  55.8  5.7  13.3  - 0.9  3.4  18.0  18.0
Burundi  78.0  89.1  76.8  11.8  0.5  _-  10.5  8.8
Burkina  Faso  160.0  42.2  40.3  0.4  1.6  - - - 58.4  40.3
Cameroon  1,246.0  69.4  66.3  2.5  0.6  0.1  1.8  6.5  22.4  14.5
Cape Vert  6.5  92.3  61.5  61.5  1.5  - - - 7.7  7.7
Central African  Rep.  139.5  94.8  94.1  0.6  - 0.1  _  0.4  4.8  3.6
Chad  132.8  37.2  31.4  0.1  5.7  _  - - 52.8  54.7
Comoros  18.9  94.7  69.8  24.3  0.1  _  - _  5.3  1.6
Congo  855.0  97.2  60.9  36.3  - - 0.1  - 2.5  23
Cote d' Ivoire  2,953.0  61.7  53.5  7.1  0.7  0.4  2.6  0.2  29.3  26.8
Djibouti  17.4  65.7  63.0  0.1  0.1  - - - 34.2  9.1
Ethiopia  294.2  66.4  40.3  11.2  14.9  0.2  4.8  0.2  26.3  12.7
Equatorial  Guinea  25.4  94.1  93.7  - - - - - 55  2.4
Gabon  2,460.5  82.8  47.7  29.7  4.1  1.2  0.4  0.7  15.2  3.6
Gambia  40.0  65.2  37.7  4.5  23.0  - - - 33.2  20.0
Ghana  1,198.9  81.6  63.4  12.8  5.4  0.1  4.6  0.2  10.0  3.1
Guinea  420.5  89.0  52.2  36.7  - - - - 11.0  4.7
Guinea  Dissau  11.7  76.1  65.7  9.4  - - - - 23.9  0.1
Kenya  1,121.1  56.2  48.6  4.3  1.3  2.0  1.4  - 35.0  21A
Liberia  379.9  80.0  77.1  1.5  0.9  0.4  1.0  - 19.0  0.2
Madagascar  314.0  88.9  64.4  14.6  9.8  - 1.7  1.1  6.9  3.1
Malawi  454.0  85.  1  46.9  16.5  10.0  11.8  - - 13.6  9.5
Mali  307.9  33.0  28.6  2.6  1.7  - 12.7  11.6  40.6  19.9
Mauritania  451.0  80.1  58.3  2.3  19.5  - 10.7  - 7.5  7.1
Mauritius  1,208.0  84.5  71.9  11.1  0.2  1.3  2.0  _  6.1  3.9
Mozambique  239.8  51.2  31.3  13.0  6.7  - - _  48.8  12.0
Niger  240.8  87.4  83.4  3.9  0.1  _  - 0.1  11.1  10.6
Nigeria  12,004.0  95.7  48.6  45.9  0.2  - 0.1  4.2  3.1
Reunion  210.2  12.9  7.2  - 4.8  9.1  - _  87.1  9.8
Rwanda  99.3  82.8  75.7  6.3  0.7  - _  4.4  6.9  23
Sao  Tome  & Principe  7.5  96.0  96.0  _-  - - 4.0  -
Senegal  737.7  63.6  60.7  0.4  2.5  - _  _  28.8  16.5
Seychelles  18.2  72.5  70.4  _  _  _  _  27.1  20.3Table 1.  Continued.
________________  ________  ~~~~~~~~~~Major  Gowgraphic  Destinations (%)
of which:  of which:
World  Developed  Eastern  Socialist  Developing
Exporting  Country  (S  million)  Countries  North  Europe  Asia  Counies  Developing
Europe  America  Japan  Others  Africa
Sierra Leone  145.4  96.5  59.1  36.2  1.3  3-  1.5  1.3
Somalia  81.0  61.1  60.2  0.4  0.5  - - 0.5  38.4  1.0
South Africa,  Rep.  17052.0  80.4  55.2  12.4  10.8  2.0  0.1  - 15-3  6.1
Sudan  554.0  35.4  26.1  3.2  6.0  - 9.0  1.6  53.8  1.1
Togo  306.4  52.0  38.2  13.0  0.2  0.6  6.5  0.1  414  19.2
Uganda  152.1  90.5  76.5  10.6  3.3  0.1  OA  - 9.1  7.1
Tanzania,  United  Rep.  404.0  68.7  59.4  4.5  4.5  0.3  1.8  0.8  30.7  7.1
Zaire  853.0  84.5  54.8  22.2  7.4  0.1  1.2  1.2  11.2  S.4
Zambia  1,347.5  65.7  34.5  1.6  29.1  0.4  - 12.3  11.8  11.9
Zimbabwe  1,467.6  73.4  44.1  7.3  5.5  16.6  0.6  1.8  23.9  171
MEMn IIEM
All Sub-Saharan  Africa  54,657.2  80.6  51.2  22.1  5.6  1.4  0.9  0.7  15.4  7.5
All Developing  Countries  708,947.0  63.1  25.5  24.0  12.0  1.3  3.1  3.6  27.2  2.6
Note: The shares  shown  in Table I may not sum to 100  since  some  sub-Saharan  countries  trade  has not been  fully  allocatcd  to proper  country  destinations.  Taz is, some  exports  are cssifiod as
going  to 'not elsewhere  specified'  (n.e.s.) destinations,  'not elsewhere  classified' (n.e.c.) destinationts,  ar to bunikets  and ships  stores.
Source:  Compiled  from United  Nations  COMTRADE  records  or United  Nations  Conference  on Trade and Development,  Handbook  of International  Trade and Develoosent  Sstics  1992
(New  York: United  Nations.  1992).6
The key point which is evident from Table 1 relate- to sub-Saharan Africa's considerably greater
than average reliance on developed countries' markets with OECD Europe being particularly important.
On average, about 80 percent of the 44 SSA countries' exports go to developed countries while the
proportion for Cape Verde, Central African Republic, the Comoros, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria,
Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Uganda exceeds 90 percent.  The difference in African and
other developing countries' reliaince  on the OECD is evident from the summary statistics, i.e., the share
of SSA exports going to developed country markets is 18 percentage points higher thais that for all
developing countries, while the share destined for OECD Europe is approximately twice as high (51.2
versus 25.5 percent).  Collectively, sub-Saharan Africa has a relatively low share of its total exports
destined for other developing countries (15 percent as opposed to 27 percent for all developing countries
intra-trade), while the share going to Japan (under 6 percent) is about one-half the developing country
average.
Having established that OECD markets are by far the major destinations for African exports, a
second related  important question is  what are  Africa's  major  traded products? Table  2  provides
infonration on the product composition  of each African country's exports as well as aggregate statistics
for the region as a whole.  Siniilar statistics are also provided for all developing countries combined.
These tabulations show sub-Saharan African exports consist of a  much higher share of agricultural
materials; minerals and nonferrous metals than exports from all developing  countries combined (61 versus
33 percent), and a much lower share of manufactures  (19 versus 54 percent). 6 Mauritius, the Republic
of South Africa and the Central African Republic are outliers with one-third, or more, of these countries'
MThe  four largest  products,  namely,  crude  petroleum  (SITC  331),  pearls  and precious  stones  (S[TC  667),  cocoa
(SITC  072) and  coffee  (071)  account  for approximately  66 percent  of African  exports  to the OECD. None  of these
items encounter  nontariff  measures  in the Eutropean  Union and United States.  Japan, however, does apply
quantitative  restrictions  to some  refined  petroleum  products. Also,  import  duties  are zero on these  major  products
except  for EU tariffs  ranging  from 8 to 16 percent  On coffee  extracts  and several  other  coffee  products  above  the
roasted  bean stage. It should  be recognized  that existing  trade barriers  may  affect  the product  shares  reported  in
Table  2 -- particularly  for some  highly  protected  groups  such  as foodstuffs.Table 2. The Structure of Sub-Saharan African Countrks'  Exports; 1990  or Latest Year Available.
By Main Categories  of Export  Prcducts  (percentage)
.________________  _________  AGGREGATE  SITC  GROUPS  Manufactures,  of which:
Value  All  Agricultural  Ores  &  Manu-  Other  Machinery  &  Unalocated
Exporting  Country  (S million)  Foods  Materials  Fuels  Metals  factures  Chemicals  Manufactures  Transport  Trade
Angola  1,296.4  16.4  0.3  82.1  - 1.0  0.  0.4  O0.
Benin  49.1  61.8  25.0  4.2  1.1  3.4  0.4  1.9  I.1  45
Burundi  75.0  65.7  3.6  - 2.5  2.0  0.1  1.6  0.3  26.1
Burkina  Faso  160.3  27.5  42.0  - 0.1  11.0  0.1  8.1  2.8  19.4
Cameroon  1,281.6  35.5  19.0  18.0  11.4  15.2  1.6  8.3  5.2  0.9
Cape  Verde  6.5  50.8  3.1  - 26.2  12.3  - 6.2  6.2  7.7
Central  African  Republic  139.5  17.3  27.6  - 5.2  48.2  0.1  47.6  0.6  1.7
Chad  132.8  44.6  45.9  - 0.3  9.0  0.5  3.5  5.1  012
Comoros  12.4  71.0  1.6  - 0.8  26.6  25.0  1.6  - -
Congo  776.9  1.3  9.0  81.4  1.4  6.6  - 5.7  0.9  0.4
Cote d' Ivoire  2,940.4  49.9  18.3  14.5  0.3  16.8  3.5  11.3  2.1  01
Djibouti  24.9  39.1  4.7  - 0.2  7.8  0.2  1.0  6.0  -
Ethiopia  294.2  63.3  25.1  6.2  - 5.3  2.0  3.2  - 0.1
Equatorial  Guinea  25.4  57.9  30.0  - 7.5  4.0  - 2.6  0.6  -
Gabon  1,692.8  1.1  10.6  74.2  10.6  3.4  1.7  1.5  0.2  02
Gambia  40.6  72.9  0.5  - 0.2  25.9  - 25.1  0.7  0.5
Ghana  1,072.3  41.0  11.1  3.4  21.2  13.4  0.1  13.0  0.3  9.9
Guinea  420.5  3.4  0.3  - 95.0  0.5  - - 0.2  -
Guinea  Bissau  11.7  73.0  2.0  - 7.8  4.9  1.6  1.4  1.6  -
Kenya  1,054.3  58.5  7.7  14.2  1.4  17.3  3.1  12.6  1.7  0.9
Liberia  404.4  8.8  29.1  0.1  59.7  1.0  0.1  0.4  0.5  I.4
Madagascar  321.9  69.7  4.5  1.0  9.4  15.2  1.5  12.7  1.0  0 2
Malawi  417.6  90.5  3.2  - 0.1  4.8  - 4.6  0.2  I.4
Mali  270.7  22.6  65.8  0.1  0.1  6.8  0.1  4.4  22  4.6
Mauritania  447.1  47.3  0.4  1.9  48.6  0.5  - 0.2  0.3  1I1
Mauritius  1,180.5  31.1  0.5  - 0.1  68.1  0.3  65.1  2.7  0.2
Mozambique  101.1  65.7  4.0  0.1  12.1  17.5  0.4  15.5  1.6  0.7
Niger  579.7  11.4  0.6  1.1  84.7  2.0  - 1.5  0.5  0.1
Nigeria  13,649.3  1.8  1.5  93.6  0.7  2.1  0.3  1.6  0.2  0.3
Reunion  185.6  82.4  0.5  0.2  0.4  16.6  2.5  5.8  8.3  -
Rwanda  97.6  69.2  9.1  - 2.4  4.7  2.8  1.7  0.2  14.7
Sao Tome  & Principe  7A  91.2  2.2  - 0.2  6.3  1.7  1.6  1.6  -
Senegal  782.6  53.2  2.7  12.4  9.3  22.5  14.9  5.2  2.4
Seychelles  34.2  37.1  0.3  55.6  - 7.0  .2  0  5.0Table 2.  Continued.
By Main Categones  of Export Products  (percentage)
AGGREGATE  SITC  GROUPS  Manufactrcs. of wbi:b:
Value  All  Agrcultural  Ores &  Manu-  Other  Machhesy &  UItocaaed
Exporting  Country  (S million)  Foods  Materials  Fuels  Metals  factures  Chemials  Mafacures  Transport  Trade
Sierra Leone  142.8  24.6  3.9  3.5  40.9  26  -1  26.0  0.1  1.0
Somalia  81.0  90.4  6.8  0.2  1.1  1.1  - 0.5  0.6  04
South Africa, Republic  of  18,968.8  13.6  9.2  13.9  26.4  34.4  6.5  24.3  3.6  2.5
Sudan  573.0  38.6  59.5  - 0.3  1.0  - 023  0.7  0.5
Togo  267.9  23.0  21.5  44.7  9.1  0.4  8.0  0.7  Ii
Uganda  152.1  88.9  10.0  - 0.1  1.1  0.1  023  0.6  -
Tanzani 1, United  Republic  284.9  49.2  22.4  1.5  14.5  11.8  0.9  8.4  2.5  0.5
Zaire  999.3  8.7  4.5  12.7  55.2  16.6  0.1  15.7  0.  23
Zambia  1,347.5  3.9  1.4  0.1  83.4  11.2  0.1  10.8  03  0.1
Zimbabwe  1,467.6  44.1  7.3  0.7  15.9  30.9  1.7  25.6  3.6  1.1
MEMO IEM
All Sub-Saharan  Africa  53,688.4  18.5  8.3  36.3  16.6  18.8  3.0  13.8  2.0  1.5
All Developing  Countries  708,947.0  11.4  3.3  26.0  4.2  53.9  3.8  29.9  17.4  --
Source:  Data Compiled  from United  Nations  COMTRADE  records  and UNCrAD, Handbook  of Intenfational  Tnde and Development  Studcs.  199  In some --sdo  the  me taie
reported in this table may differ from those shown  in Table 1.  Where  this occurs  data on the direction  of trade bad to be taken from a dffrtm  year than dte above  siak  on i.e
composition  of trde.
Note: In terms of the SITC (Revision  1) classification  the proeucts  groups  shown in this table are defmed  as folows: All foods  and Feeds (SITC  0+ 1  +22+4);  AgIculma  Raw  Isura
(SITC 2-22-27-28);  Fuels (SITC 3); Ores, Minerals  and Metals  (SITC 27+28+68); Manufactures  (SITC 5 +6+7+8-68);  Chemicas (STIC 5); Odrcr  Mamifcrs  CSITC  668,  Machmmy
and Transport  (SITC 7).9
total exports consisting  of manufactured goods.'  This point is important since materials which normally
serve as production inputs (i.e.,  the types of goods African countries export) typically face low or zero
tariffs and relatively few NTBs.  OECD trade barriers generally are applied with a higher than average
frequency to temperate zone agricultural products and labor intensive manufactures, and are normally
more restrictive than average on these goods (see UNCTAD 1993, Laird and Yeats 1990, or Yeats 1979).
III. Pre-Uruguay Round NTBs Facing!  Africa
Given that the OECD is of disproportionate (high) importance for Africa, what does available
show as to the nature and extent of developed countries nontariff barriers?  Utilizing World Bank-
UNCTAD records, Table 3 shows the share of OECD imports from: (i) other OECD countries, (ii)
developing countries, and (iii) all sub-Saharan African countries that encounter NTBs. 8 The latter
tabulations are given both with the Republic of South Africa included and excluded due to the relatively
high share of manufactures in the latter's exports and the fact that South Africa was subject to sanctions
as a result of its apartheid policies.  As indicated, developed countries' nontariff measures affect a
notably higher share of imports from non-OECD countries than they do for intra-trade.  Approximately
17 percent of developing counties' exports (excluding petroleum) encounter NTBs, while the
7Standard  practice  defines  manufactures  as all items  in SITC 5 through  8 less SITC  68 (nonferrous  metals).
Included  within  this range  is the three-digit  group 'pearls and precious  stones  (SITC  667). The  SITC  system  does
not distinguish  between  cut and polished  gems  (which  should  be considered  a manufacture)  and uncut  gems  (which
should  not). The Central  African  Republic's  exports  are probably  composed  mostly  of uncut  stones  which,  due to
the deficiency  in the SITC  system,  are included  in the manufactures  product group.  In  other  words,  if uncut  stones
could  be identified  separately  the share  of manufactures  in the Central  African  Republic's  exports  probably  would
be far lower  than shown  in Table 2.
"Laird  and Yeats  (1990, Chapter  4) describe  how this inventory  of nontariff  measures  was constructed  and
discuss  its limitations  for research  and policy  studies. In particular,  they  note  that trade  coverage  ratios  are  a rough
approximation  of the importance  of NTBs  in that they  provide  no indication  of the restrictiveness  of the measures.
Low  coverage  ratios,  for example,  could  be associated  with highly  restrictive  NTBs  and vice-versa.  The  Laird  and
Yeats  book also provides  extensive  empirical  information  on the results of NTB inventory  studies  for industrial
countries.  UNCTAD  (1993, p. 37) tabulates  the annual  share  of developing  countries'  exports  that encountered
nontariff  measures  over the last decade  -- it rose from 16.2  percent in 1981  to 18.3  percent  in 1991.Table 3. 1992 Nontariff Measure Coverage Ratios for OECD Imports from Developed, Developing  and Sub-Sabaran African Countries
1992 Imports (Smillion)  N  !lontariff  Barrier Coverage Ratios
Sub-  SSA  Sub-  SSA
Developed  Developing  Saharan  excluding  Developed  Developing  Saharan  excluding
Product Group (SITC)  Countries  Countries  Africa  South Africa  Countries  Countries  Africa  South Africa
ALL NON-FUEL  ITEMS (0 TO 9-3)  1,900,481  540,783  25,137  15,647  9.7  16.6  10.8  10.4
All Foods (0+ 1  +22+4)  190.602  79,053  8,022  6,223  24.6  17.1  23.4  18.6
Food and Live Animals  (0)  152,772  69,241  7,044  5,327  28.1  18.2  24.5  19.5
Oil Seeds and Nuts (22)  5,849  2,509  72  59  1.3  3.6  6.3  2.2
Animal & Vegetable  Oils (4)  5.046  2,841  171  169  5.7  5.7  0.1  0.1
Agricultural  Materials (2-22-27-28)  53,386  20,303  2,719  2,109  1.3  1.3  0.3  0.2
Ores and Metals (27 +28 +67 +68)  116,438  42,227  7,521  2,810  13.6  10.1  5.7  2.6
Ferrous Metals (67)  55,326  11,294  1,097  171  38.2  35.9  38.6  44.4
Non-Ferrous Metals (68)  37,753  15,192  3,677  1,465  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Mineral Fuels (3)  86,298  164,851  19,654  18,012  21.5  16.4  17.4  16.8
All Manufactures  (5 to 8 -68)  1,499,800  383.811  6,524  6,369  8.5  18.8  5.6  6.5
Chemicals  (5)  216,755  22,039  769  320  6.0  3.9  0.2  0.0
Other Manufactures  (6 to 8-67-68)  1,283,045  361,832  5,755  3,953  8.8  19.9  6.4  9.7
Leather (61)  5,004  3,749  237  134  3.0  1.2  0.0  0.0
Textile Yarn & Fabric (65)  49,545  19,485  275  173  4.4  52.5  18.7  34.1
Clothing (84)  43,250  79,659  1,019  845  3.4  62.5  44.8  47.5
Footwear  5)  12,142  15,864  17  7  12.2  32.0  1.3  2.6
ALL ITEMS (0 to 9)  1,986,779  705,634  44,791  33,659  10.2  16.6  13.1  13.1
Note: The following  measures  were included in the computation  of the nontariff barrier coverage ratio: tariff quotas; increased  duties, safeguard  duties, retaliatory duties and
customs  surcharges;  variable levies  and flexible  import  fees; non-automatic  licensing  and discretionary  licensing,  quotas and prohibitions;  voluntary  export restraints,  MFA quotas
and other restraints including  textile restraint agreements, orderly marketing  arrangements;  other quantitative restrictions; other restrictions imposed  under the Multifiber
Arrangement;  minimum, reference or other import price controls; voluntary  export  price restraints; state monopoly  of imports; and local content regulations.
Source:  World Bank-UNCTAD  SMART Data Base. The statistics in this and the tables that follow reflect nontariff  barriers which are applied in all OECD markets with the
exception  of Iceland and Turkey. Developed  countries  are defined as all OECD members  less Turkey while developing  countries  are all countries less the OECD plus Turkey.
The countries included  in the sub-Saharan  group are listed in Table 4.corresponding share for OECD intra-trade is under  10 percent.  An even greater difference in NTB
coverage ratios exists for several product groups.  Approximately 53 percent of developing countries'
textile exports face restrictions while the coverage ratio for clothing is about 63 percent.  In contrast,
under  5 percent  of  OECD  intra-trade in  textiles and  clothing encounters  NTBs.  The  Multifiber
Arrangement, special textile quotas, bilateral quotas, and voluntary export restraints account for these
major differences.  Nontariff barrier coverage ratios for developing countries' footwear exports are about
20 points higher than on OECD intra-trade of these goods.  'Voluntary" export restraints imposed by the
EU and EFTA largely account for these differentials.'
Table 3 shows OECD coverage ratios  are not always higher for  African and other
developing countries'  exports.  Twenty five percent of OECD intra-trade in  foods encounter NTBs
compared to the 17 percent coverage ratio for shipments of these goods from developing countries.'°
The difference is due to the fact that tropical food products like tea, coffee, and cocoa - which account
for approximately 15 percent of all developing countries' food exports  - face relatively few OECD
nontariff barriers.  Most NTBs are applied to temperate zone products (particularly grains and dairy
products) which are mainly exported by other OECD and some developing countries, like Argentina,
outside the tropics.  Sugar, which is produced in temperate zone countries (from beets) as well as in the
tropics (from cane) is an exception.  Some specific African oilseeds and vegetable oils which can be
9'here is ample  evidence  showing  that textile  and footwear  restrictions  have major  trade distorting  cffects  on
the exports  of developing  countries  who face  the measures. For example,  Figure  1 shows  US International  Trade
Commission  estimates  of tariff plus NTB protection  for 54 broad classes  of textile  and clothing  products. The
estimates  range to over 100 percent  with the nontariff  barrier component  of total protection  generally  being  far
higher  than that of tariffs. It is generally  held that levels  of nontariff  protection  against  textiles  and clothing  in
Europe  are of a similar  magnitude  to that of the United  States,
")Estimates  of the restrictive  effects  of these NTBs  show the barriers are formidable. The USITC  (1989)
estimated  that the ad valorem  equivalents  of existing  US NTBs  on 54 broad categories  of textile and clothing
products ranged between 15 to over 100 percent.  Laird and Yeats (1990) found that estimates  for nominal
equivalents  of NTBs  on grains, sugar,  dairy, vegetable  oils, poultry,  pork, oilseeds  and nuts imported  into the EU
and Japan ranged from 50 to 300 percent and more. See Saxon and Anderson  (1982) and OECD  (1987 for
additional  estimates  of agricultural  NTBs  ad valorem  equivalents.I 2.
Figure 1: The Estimated Total Effect of Tariff and Nontariff
Protection for Textiles and Clothing in the United States
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substitutes for OECD temperate zone products encounter NTBs in the form of European  variable import
levies.
Table 3 indicates  the profile of nontariff protection against sub-Saharan African exports differs
in some ways from that of other developing countries. First, only about 11 percent of African non-fuel
exports face NTBs as opposed to the 17 percent average for all developing countries.  The lower NTB
ratio is largely accounted for by the fact that most African countries' textile and clothing products are not
affected by MFA restrictions, and the fact that African exports of footwear are relatively  small. Mauritius
is a noteworthy  exception  with $116 million, or 88 percent of its textile and clothing exports to the United
States, covered b)y  textile quotas.  Only 19 percent of African textile exports face NTBs, as opposed
to 53 percent for all developing countries combined, while  the African coverage ratio for clothing is about
18 points below the 63 percent developing country average.  This pattern is reversed, however, for
several food and feed product  groups where African countries encounter a higher incidence of NTBs than
all developing countries."
Analysis of the patterns of NTB protection in individual OECD markets indicates  that EU trade
barriers are directed against African and other developing countries' exports with an above average
frequency.  While Table 4 shows that only 2 to 3 percent of sub-Saharan African exports to EFTA, Japan
and the United States encounter nontariff measures the coverage ratio for the European Union is about
ten times higher (21.2 percent).  In contrast, less than 9 percent of EU imports from the OECD face
nontariff measures.  Six African countries have more than one-quarter of their total exports to the
European Union covered by NTBs, with the coverage ratios for Reunion and the Seychellk  s ranging from
88 to 96 percent.  Sugar's importance in Reunion's and several other African countries' exports (sugar
"If coffee  were excluded  from the tabulations  the African  food trade coverage  ratios  would  be considerably
lower than those for developed  and all developing  countries. Coffee  exports are subject  to quantitative  controls
(voluntary export restraints) imposed under the Intemnational Coffee Agreement.  Special taxes are also applied to
coffee imports in several European markets.Table 4. The Share of African Exports Covered by Nontariff Measures: All OECD Countries and Major Industrial Markets.
1992 Value of Exports (Smillion)  Share of  Exports Covered  by NTBs
Exporter  All OECD  EFTA  EU  Japan  USA  All OECD  EFTA  EU  Japan  USA
Angola  3,684  1  1,132  5  2,436  4.7  2.2  14.7  0.0  0.0
Benin  76  1  60  2  10  1.3  7.S  1.5  0.0  0.0
Burkina Paso  53  --  41  5  - 12.3  32.8  13.1  0.0  20.8
Burundi  74  6  22  2  9  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Cameroon  1,577  8  1,360  13  90  20.8  0.1  26.8  0.0  0.0
Cape  Verde  7  --  6  1  - 39.5  0.0  60.8  0.0  0.0
Central  African  Rep.  102  - 99  - I  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0
Chad  66  1  42  5  _  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
Comoros  28  - 13  - I 1  0.6  1.1  0.3  16.2  0.0
Congo  1,440  13  851  2  547  38.5  19.7  4  0.0  0.0
Cote D'Ivoire  2,258  49  1,623  16  206  14.1  2.4  16.1  0.0  3.6
Djibouti  4  1  3  - - 5.2  46.2  3.2  0.0  0.0
Equatorial  Guinea  39  --  37  - - 0.1  0.0  0.1  20.0  0.0
Ethiopia  160  6  67  44  9  1.8  1.3  3.3  0.0  0.0
Gabon  2,119  31  956  89  984  15.8  0.1  22.6  0.0  0.0
Gambia  183  1  145  36  1  0.5  1.6  0.9  0.0  0.0
Ghana  886  42  442  65  102  0.4  3.7  0.4  0.0  0.0
Guinea  526  29  329  1  125  0.3  4.2  0.4  0.0  0.0
Guinea Bissau  8  ..  7  - - 1.6  0.0  1.7  0.0  0.0
Kenya  837  58  510  22  78  3.5  4.3  3.8  7.6  0.0
Liberia  804  90  642  43  13  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Madagascar  340  20  188  32  56  7.6  1.1  9.6  0.0  7.9
Malawi  393  20  130  68  64  29.6  13.5  18.2  99.5  13.4
Mali  117  1  95  5  2  0.4  2.4  0.5  0.0  0.0
Mauritania  413  - 241  151  10  1.3  1.6  2.3  0.1  0.0
Mauritius  1,279  23  950  4  147  61.6  43.0  59.9  2.0  79.9
Mozambique  147  4  94  16  21  10.3  5.7  9.1  0.0  31.7
Niger  184  1  172  - 3  0.2  7.2  0.2  0.0  0.2
Nigeria  11,379  510  3,720  2  5,299  14.4  0.1  38.2  0.0  0.1
Reunion  154  - 151  1  - 83.0  8.5  88.8  1.4  0.0
Rwanda  64  32  - 5  1.1  0.4  1.2  0.0  0.0
Sao Tome & Principe  5  --  3  - - 17.2  0.0  18.4  0.0  0.0
Senegal  362  6  317  1  1  11  19.1  29.4  20.0  0.1  0.4
Seychelles  37  34  I  91.4  7.1  95.5  0.0  0.0Table 4.  Continued.
1992  Value  of Exports  ($illion)  Share  of Exports  Covered  by NTBs  _
Exporter  All OECD  EFRA  EU  Japan  USA  All OECD  EFrA  EU  Japan  USA
Sierra Leone  354  3  256  3  65  0.1  7.6  0.1  0.0  0.0
Somalia  19  1  14  - 2  9.0  0.0  9.6  0.0  0.0
South  Africa  11,132  525  4,892  1,781  1,878  13.0  5.2  14.9  21.1  0.0
Sudan  149  5  74  29  1  1  12.4  0.1  17.4  0.0  0.0
Tanzania  266  8  158  33  12  3.8  1.2  5.4  0.1  0.0
Togo  121  8  65  1  7  0.5  0.7  0.5  2.2  0.0
Uganda  162  4  120  4  14  0.0  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0
Zaire  1,277  17  801  83  259  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0
Zambia  630  8  279  249  71  0.7  12.1  0.7  0.0  0.0
Zimbabwe  875  54  418  120  114  20.3  6.5  28.5  4.4  8.5
TOTAL  SSA  44,791  1,556  21,592  2,945  12,675  13.1  3.4  19.7  13.2  1.6
SSA  excl. S.Africa  33,659  1,031  16,700  1,164  10,798  13.1  2.5  21.2  3.2  1.9
Developed  Countries  1,986,779  186,789  908,622  110,548  317,996  10.2  6.6  8.8  16.5  15.4
Developing  Countries  705,634  29,551  204,374  120,426  233,595  16.6  15.1  24.9  4.2  15.4
Note:  See the noted  to Table  3 for county definitions  and a listing  of measures  that  have  been  included  in the computation  of the NTB  coverage  ratios.
Source:  Trade  statistics  from  UN COMTRADE  records.  NTB  information  from  the World  Bank-UNCTAD  SMART  Database.16
faces  variable  levies  in Europe)  accounts  for the high  ratios  while  the results  for the Seychelles  are largely
due to EU reference  prices for imports  of tuna and skipjack.
In the United  States  the pattern  of nontariff  protection  is the reverse  of that for the European
Union. Here, less than 2 percent of all African  exports face nontariff  restrictions,  while the NTB
coverage  ratio for US imports  from developed  countries  is 15 percent.  Almost  21 percent of Burkina
Faso's exports  to the US encounter  NTBs  - mostly  due to global  quotas  on imports  of feathers  totalling
$77,000  - while  Mozambique's  ratio is 32 percent  due to US tariff quotas  and variable  levies  on sugar.
Aside  from the Republic  of South  Africa,  nontariff  barriers  in Japan  do not appear  to pose  much
of a problem  for Africa.  Malawi  is an exception  as almost  all of its exports  (which  consist solely of
tobacco)  are required  to pass through  a regulatory  state import agency. Between  16 to 20 percent of
Equatorial  Guinea  and  the Comoros  imports  face  Japanese  NTBs  - the forner's exports  (parts  of tropical
plants)  are also required to pass through  a state agency while the Comoros  exports of whalebone  is
subject  to a global  quota. For most  other African  countries,  however,  the Japanese  NTB  coverage  ratios
are zero, or very low.
Table  5 provides  one  further  perspective  on OECD  protection  facing  African  exports  by showing
NTB trade coverage  ratios for major product  groups,  both in total and for individual  countries. These
tabulations  indicate  NTBs  on most African  countries'  food  exports  are far more important  than  those  on
manufactures  (i.e., the coverage  ratio for food  is 23 percent  versus 5.7 percent  for manufactures).  For
some  countries  the food coverage  ratios exceed  80 percent (Djibouti,  Mauritius  and Reunion)  and reach
94 percent for the Seychelles.  The importance of this point is highlighted by the fact that numerous
studies  have  estimated  that  European  Union  and  Japanese  NTBs  on many  food  products  have  ad valorem
equivalents  of 50 to 200 percent or more (see Laird and Yeats 1991 for a survey of these studies'
findings).
In contrast  to foods  and  feeds,  only about  three-tenths  of one percent  of African  agricultural  rawTable S. The NTB Coverage of Mfajor Product Categories of African Exports to OECD Mlarkets.
1992 Value of OECD Impons(USS  millions)  Share of OECD Imports  Covered by Nontariff Measures
All  Foods &  Agricultural  Ores & Non-  All  Foods &  Agricultural  Ores. & Non-
Exporter  Goods  Feeds  Materials  Ferrous Metals  Manufactures  'voods  Feeds  Materials  Ferrous Metals  Manufactures
Angola  3,684  17  1  2  192  4.7  4.9  0.0  0.0  0.0
Benin  76  22  32  - 12  1.3  3.5  0.0  0.0  1.5
Burkina  Faso  53  13  35  n.a.  4  12.3  51.1  0.2  6.5  0.5
Burundi  74  65  3  4  2  0.1  0.1  0.0  7.6  0.1
Cameroon  1,577  335  346  84  44  20.8  5.0  0.0  0.3  17.2
Cape Verde  7  6  0.1  - 1  39.5  67.9  0.0  0.0  7.9
Central African Rep.  102  S  19  - 78  0.1  0.0  0.0  4.4  0.1
Chad  66  1  64  - I  0.1  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0
Comoros  28  20  - - 8  0.6  0.0  28.8  0.0  0.6
Congo  1,440  11  122  6  365  38.5  58.5  1.2  0.0  0.1
Cote D'Ivoire  2,258  1,587  364  3  266  14.1  17.9  0.2  0.0  16.7
Djibouti  4  - I  - 2  5.2  87.0  0.0  5.;  3.1
Equatorial  Guinea  39  6  29  2  2  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1
Ethiopia  160  92  27  - 40  1.8  1.1  0.0  0.0  7.4
Gabon  2,119  16  189  180  70  15.8  0.6  0.0  0.0  2.8
Gambia  183  49  1  - 133  0.5  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0
Ghana  886  386  130  266  88  0.4  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.1
Guinea  526  18  5  370  132  0.3  6.2  0.0  0.0  0.0
Guinea Bissau  8  4  2  - 1  1.6  2.3  0.0  2.7  1.8
Kenya  837  591  107  11  111  3.5  4.2  1.7  0.0  0.2
Liberia  804  2  90  41  546  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0
Madagascar  340  251  13  25  50  7.6  6.3  0.0  0.0  24.2
Malawi  393  363  10  - 18  29.6  28.0  0.0  28.3  59.3
Mali  117  4  52  - 61  0.4  3.4  0.1  3.8  0.1
Mauritania  413  206  1  201  3  1.3  0.6  0.0  0.0  2A
Mautitius  1,279  408  6  1  860  61.6  86.5  5.4  0.0  47.2
Mozambique  147  108  21  4  13  10.3  13.2  0.0  0.0  4.4
Niger  184  1  2  1  179  0.2  10.4  1.4  10.3  0.0
Nigeria  11,379  200  111  17  155  14.4  0.3  0.0  13.7  2.1
Reunion  154  147  1  1  6  83.0  89.5  0.0  0.0  2.0
Rwanda  64  50  8  3  2  1.1  1.1  0.0  0.0  2.1
Sao Tome & Principe  5  4  - - 1  17.2  18.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
Senegal  362  291  17  25  21  19.1  24.6  0.0  0.0  2.8
Seychelles  37  34  _  _  2  91.4  94.3  0.0  8.0  0.6
*-.-__  __Table 5. Continued.
________________  ____1992  Value of OECD Imports(USS  millions)  Share of OECD Inports  Covered by Nontariff  Measures
All  Foods &  Agricultural  Ores & Non-  All  Foods &  Agricultural  Ores, & Non-
Exporter  Goods  Feeds  Materials  Ferrous Metals  Manufactures  Goods  Feeds  Materials  Ferrous Metals  Manufactures
Sierra Leone  354  47  1  86  220  0.1  0.3  5.5  0.0  0.0
Somalia  19  16  2  0.1  1  9.0  11.6  0.0  43.1  0.0
South Africa  11.132  1,799  609  4,711  2,251  13.0  57.1  0.6  8.4  0.4
Sudan  149  39  102  1  6  12.4  31.9  0.0  0.0  0.0
Tanzania  266  153  36  34  40  3.8  5.8  0.0  0.0  5.3
Togo  121  31  14  64  7  0.5  1.6  0.1  0.0  0.2
Uganda  162  143  16  0.3  3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Zaire  1,277  80  64  472  395  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1
Zambia  630  16  6  579  28  0.7  29.8  0.0  0.0  0.6
Zimbabwe  875  386  61  324  102  20.3  30.3  0.1  19.4  8.0
SSA  44,791  8,022  2,719  7,521  6,524  13.1  23.4  0.3  5.7  5.6
SSA excl S.Africa  33,412  7,822  2,608  7,503  6,369  13.1  18.6  0.2  2.6  6.5
Developing  Countries  705,634  79,053  20,303  42,227  383,871  16.6  17.1  1.3  10.1  18.8
Developed  Countries  1,986,779  190,602  53,386  116,438  1.499.800  10.2  24.6  1.3  13.6  8.5
l~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Source: Trade data from United Nations COMTRADE  files. Nontariff  barrier information  from World Bank-UNCTAD  SMART  Data Base.  See the notes to Table 2 for the componens of thc
product groups shown in this table defined in terms of the SITC (revision 1) classification  system. The notes to Table 3 indicate which  nontariff measures have been employed  for the computation
of dhe  trade coverage ratios.19
material exports encounter NTBs, while the ratio for the ores, minerals and metals group is under 6
percent -- about the same for manufactures.  Mauritius and Malawi's coverage ratios for manufactures
are exceptions, being 8 or more times the SSA average.  As previously noted, US textile quotas are a
factor responsible for the Mauritius' results -- see Figure I for estimated ad valorem equivalents  of these
MFA restrictions. Import certification regulations are applied to ivory and reptile skin products exported
from Malawi.  Between 17 to 24 percent of Cameroon, Cote d'lvoire and Madagascar's manufactures
exports  encounter  NTBs, but  aside from  these  countries the coverage  ratios are  low.  In  fact,
manufactures exports from 11 of the 44 countries encounter no NTBs, and 56 percent (25 out of 44) of
the African countries have less than one percent of their manufactured exports facing nontariff measures.
Table 6  addresses the question of what types of  nontariff measures do SSA exports most
frequently encounter.  Shown here are total 1992 OECD imports (both including and excluding fuels)
from individual African countries and summary statistics showing African group totals.  The table also
indicates the share of this exchange that face six categories  of nontariff measures: (i) all NTBs; (ii) price
raising measures; (iii) quotas and prohibitions; (iv) "voluntary" export restraints; (v) non-automatic
licensing requirements; and (vi) other restrictions.  The notes to Table 6 indicate the specific types of
measures included in each nontariff barrier group.
Overall, quantitative restrictions are the most important type of barriers facing African exports,
although the relative importance of these measures changes when fuels are excluded from the tabulations
(Box 1 summarizes the nontariff barriers which are applied to fuel imports in major OECD markets).
QRs affect approximately 8 percent of African exports followed by price raising restrictions that cover
4 percent of total trade.' 2 When energy products are excluded, however, the importance of price raising
121n some cases, the sum of the coverage  ratios  for the six different  types of measures  may exceed  the total
shown  for all NTBs. This  is due to the  multiple  application  or "stacking"  of more than  one type  of nontariff  barrier
on a single  product. For example,  the United  States  applies  flexible  import  charges  (variable  levies) to sugar
imports and also subjects this trade to a tariff quota.Table 6. The Relative Importance of Different Types of OECD Nontariff Measures Facing African Exports.
Share of OECD Imports Facing Nontariff Measures
1992  OECD fmports  All Nontariff  Price Raising  Quotas and  Nun-Auto atic  Oiber
(Smillion)  Measures  Measures  Prohibitions  VERs  Licensing  Measures
Exporter  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Totl  Non-Fuel
Angola  3,684  219  4.7  1.2  0.0  0.'  4.7  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Benin  76  66  1.3  1.5  0.9  1.1  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Burkina  Faso  53  53  12.3  12.3  0.4  0.4  12.2  12.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Burundi  74  74  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Cameroon  1,577  814  20.8  3.7  0.0  0.1  20.8  3.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Cape Verde  7  7  39.5  39.5  15.1  15.2  24.4  24.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Central African Rep.  102  102  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Chad  66  66  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Comoros  28  28  0.6  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Congo  1.440  508  38.5  3.8  1.4  3.1  37.1  0.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Cote D-lvoire  2,258  2,223  14.1  14.4  2.6  2.7  11.4  11.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Djibouti  4  3  5.2  5.2  2.8  2.8  2.4  2.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Equatorial  Guinea  39  39  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Ethiopia  160  160  1.8  1.8  0.3  0.3  1.5  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Gabon  2,119  458  15.8  1.5  0.0  0.0  15.8  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Gambia  183  183  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Ghana  886  872  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Guinea  526  526  0.3  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Guinea  Bissau  8  8  1.6  1.6  0.2  0.2  1.5  1.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Kenya  837  833  3.5  3.5  1.3  1.3  2.2  2.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Liberia  804  720  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Madagascar  340  340  7.6  7.6  4.7  4.7  2.9  2.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Malawi  393  393  29.6  29.6  9.0  9.0  20.6  20.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Mali  117  117  0.4  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Mauritania  413  413  1.3  0.3  0.2  0.3  1.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Maurilius  1.279  1,279  61.6  61.7  32.5  32.5  16.6  16.6  13.1  13.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Mozambique  147  147  10.3  10.3  9.1  9.1  1.2  1.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Niger  184  184  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Nigeria  11,379  497  14.4  1.0  0.0  0.4  14.3  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Reunion  154  154  83.0  83.0  81.2  81.2  1.8  1.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Rwanda  64  64  1.1  1.1  0 0  0.0  1.1  1.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Sao Tome & Principe  5  5  17.2  17.5  17.2  17.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Senegal  362  357  19.1  19.1  5.8  5.8  13.3  13.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
L  Seychelles  37  37  91.4  91.4  83.0  83.0  8.3  8.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0Table 6. Conltnued
Share of OECD Imports Facing Nontariff Measures
1992  OECD Imports  All Nontariff  Price Raising  Quotas and  Non-Automatic  Other
(Smillion)  Measures  Measures  Prohibitions  VERs  Licensing  Measures
Exporer  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel  Total  Non-Fuel
Sierra  Leone  354  354  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Soratlia  19  19  9.0  9.0  4.1  4.1  5.0  5.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
South  Africa  11,132  9.490  13.0  1  1.5  9.4  10.6  3.9  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2
Sudan  149  149  12.4  12.4  12.3  12.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Tanxania  266  266  3.8  4.1  3.1  3.4  0.7  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Togo  121  lIS  0.5  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Uganda  162  162  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Zaire  1,277  1,126  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Zambia  630  630  0.7  0.7  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Zimbabwe  875  875  20.3  20.5  18.7  18.9  2.3  2.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
SSA  44.791  25,137  13.1  10.8  4.9  7.5  8.0  3.0  0.3  0.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
SSA  excl SAfrica  33.659  15,647  13.1  10.4  3.5  6.0  9.3  3.8  0.4  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Developing  Countries  705.634  540,783  16.6  16.6  3.3  3.6  4.8  2.0  9.6  12.5  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
Developed  Countries  1,986,779  1,900.481  10.2  9.7  2.6  2.4  2.9  2.3  5.0  5.2  0.0  0.0  0.3  03 ~~~~-  =  -.  . _  . =  . ,  . _  _  .
Note:  For a listing  of all measures  that  were  cLassiried  as nontariff  barriers  see  the  notes  to Table  3. 7he classification  used  for the  different  rypes  of nontariff  barriers  is as  follows-
(i). Price  raising  measures  include  tariff quotas,  increased  duties,  safeguard  duties,  retaliatory  duties,  customs  surcharges.  variable  levies  and  flexible impon  fees,  impon  price  controls  inchding
reference  and  minimum  import prices,  and 'voluntary' e*pcr.  price  restraints.
(ii) Quotas  and  prohibitions  include  non-automatk  and  discretionary  licensing  requiremenis,  bilateral  and  global  quotas,  seasonal  quotas,  and  state  monopoly  of imports.
(iii).  'Voluntary' export  restraints  include  orderly  marketing  arrangements,  all restricions  relating  to the  Multifiber  Arrangement,  other  textile  export  restraint  agreements  and  quotas
(iv). Nonautomatic  licensing  includes  import  permit  requircments,  imports  restricted  to  select  purchasers,  permit  dependanton  the  purchaseoflocal  goods,  and  other  discretionary  lcensin schemes.
(v). Other  entry formalities  include  prohibitions  for noncommercial  purposes,  miscellancous  regulations  including  import  certification  requirements,  and  lcal  content  import  requirements.
Source:  Trade  statistis from United  Nations  COMTRADE  records.  Nontariff  barrfir information  from the  UNCTAD-World  Bank  SMART  Data  Base.Box I: Noniariff Barriers  Annlied  to OECD  Energy  Imno-rt.
The  previous analysis documented  two  points  relating  to OECD  nonuiriH  barriers  on cnergy  Imports. First. ihe  NTh
covcrage ratios for these products (17.4 percent -- sc  Table 3) Is approximately  7 percentage  points lilgher  lihan  that fir  nil nion-
fuel goods  imported  from Africa. Second  the OECD restrictions  often take  the form of price raising measures,  althouoghi  energy
products  are  also  subject  to quotas  and  special  import  authorization  requiremcnts  (quotas  In Japan  are particularly  important).
A third  point  is that  NTBs  on energy  imports  were  virtually  unaffected  by die Uruguay  Round.  As a result,  in the  post-Uruguay
cnvironment  this sector  will be one  of the more  heavily  NTB ridden  of all product  groups.
Country  Measures  Applied  Products  Affected
Australia  None  Reponed  No restrictions  reported  on any  coal, petroleum  or gas  imports.
Austria  Licensing,  Excise  Taxes  License  required  to import  lignite. Excise  taxCs  applied  to crude  and
refined  petroleum  products.
Canada  None  Reported  No restrictions  reported  on any coal, petrolcum  or gas  imports
European  Union  None  Reported  No restrictions  reported  on any coal, petrolcum  or gas  imports.
Finland  Licensing,  Quotas  Discretionary  licensing  for coal, coke  and  crude  and  refined  petroleum.
Global  quotas  on refined  petroleum  products,  gasoline  and  petroleum
based  coke.
Japan  Quotas, Tariff  Global  quotas  on coal  imports. Tariff quotas  on refined  petroleum
Quotas  products  and  gasoline.
New  Zealand  None  Reported  No restrictions  reported  on any coal, petroleum  or gas  imports.
Norway  Import  Authorization  Import  authorization  needed  for peat,  refined  petroleum  and gasoline.
Sweden  Additional  Charges  Special  additional  fiscal  charges  on coal  and  natural  gas
Switzerland  Surcharges.  Excise  Tax  Surcharges  applied  to fuel oil imports.  Excise  taxes  on petroleum  based
lubricants
United  States  Product  Specific  Tax  Special  taxes  and  charges  on crude  and  refined  petroleum  products
The  above  tabulations  list th  types  of restrictions  that  are  applicd  to  cnergy  imports  in I I major  OECD  markets.  The
fact that price raising  measures  (tariff quots, product  specific  taxes,  surcharges,  etc.)  are applied  in over one-half  of these
countries  could  have  implications  for exporters  of refined  products,  i.e., any  attempts  to increase  trade  through  subsidies  or other
price  lowering  measures  could  be  offset  by increased  taxes  on imports.  Inporting countries  might  have  an incentive  to raise  these
charges  to protect  domestic  refining  industries  (or  domestic  coal  producers  as  in the  case  of Japan)  and  could  easily  do so  given
that none  of these  special  charges  are  legally  bound  under  existing  GABT regulations.
From  the viewpoint  of energy  exporting  countries,  how  much  importance  should  be attributed  to the  measures  listed
above.  While there  appear  to have  been  no fonnal  studies  that  attempted  to  estimate  their  ad valorem  incidence  there  is reason
to believe  that  they  do not have  a major  cost  raising  impact  on imports. Energy  is an  imporant  production  input  for many  key
OECD  industries  (agriculture,  ferrous  and  nonferrous  metals,  transport  and  machinery,  etc.)  and  binding  import  restrictions  on
coal, oil and  natural  gas  could severely  disadvantage  domestic  industry  reladve  to foreign  suppliers.  However,  given  that. in
the post-Uruguay  Round  environment,  this will be one  of the most  heavily NTB ridden  sectors,  furLher  analysis  is warranted
on the impact  of these  measures  on the level  and  structure  of energy  trade.23
measures, which are applied to  many agricultural products, is more than double that of quantitative
restrictions.  Voluntary export restraints (including MFA restrictions on Africa) are marginal -- they
affect only about four-tenths of a percent of SSA exports and are only applied to  shipments from
Mauritius and Nigeria.
IV. The Achievements  of the Uruiguav  Round
The foregoing discussion established two main points.  First, before the Uruguay Round some
African countries faced important OECD nontariff barriers,  although others  exports were  largely
unaffected.  Second, these measures are applied more often against developing countries than against
other countries'  xports.  This situation  will change markedly as a  result of the Uruguay Round's
achievements in the areas of agriculture, textiles and clothing, and safeguar  l.  While the Round also
achieved agreemnent  on  the elimnination  of  "voluntary" export restraints these measures are only of
marginal importance to a few African countries' exports.
A. Agriculture
After more than four decades during which the agriculture was excluded from mainstream GATT
rules the Uruguay Round achieved a major breakthrough.  The agreement requires that participating
govermnents do not "maintain, resort to,  or revert to  any measures of the kind which have been ...
converted into ordinary customns  duties."'  3 The barriers to be converted include vitualy  all nontariff
measures.  Specific mention is made of quantitative  import restrictions, variable import levies,  ini
'3Article  4.2 of the Agreement  on Agriculture. Essentially,  the Agreement  covers all items in Harmonized
System  chapters  1 through  24 (excluding  fish and fish products)  plus a number  of additional  products  like: raw
cotton,  silk, flax and hemp;  wool  and animal  hair; raw fur skins  and other  hides and skdns;  sorbitol  and mannitol;
essential  oils; and several  finishing  agents. As a result  of the exclusion  of fish, this product  group (along  with
chemicals  and energy  products)  will  be among  the most heavily  ridden  NTB  sectors  after  the Round.24
import prices, discretionary import licensing, and nontariff measures maintained through state trading
enterprises, and voluntary export restraints.
Nontariff measures are to  be  converted into  ad  valorem or  specific tariffs as  soon as  the
agreement enters into force.  The resultant tariffs are to be "bound" and reduced over a period of six
years."  The agreement includes a  special safeguard measure which allows an additional duty to be
imposed on a product if its price falls, or the volume of imports increases, by a specified amount.
The conversion of NTBs under the "tariffication" exercise is based on the difference between
internal and external prices during 1986-88. The relevant calculations have been undertaken at the four-
or six-digit level of the Harmonized System.  Tariff equivalents for most processed products were not
calculated from direct price comparisons, but were computed as an average of those for the component
products weighted by their share in the final good.  Both the base year for the tariffication exercise, and
the manner in which the calculations were undertaken, could lead to increases in the level of short-term
protection, but any such increases should be lowered by the tariff reduction commitments  (i.e., industrial
countries will lower tariffs by 36 percent over six years while developing countries will stage reductions
of  24  percent  over  ten  years).  In  addition,  'tariffied"  products  are  subject to  minimum access
requirements which are guaranteed, where necessary, through tariff quotas.'5 The Round also achieved
commitments to  reduce domestic agricultural support measures and export subsidies.  These changes
should both increase export opportnities  for African countries and also substantially  reduce the level of
"A tariff binding  is the legally  set maximum  rate at which  an import  duty may  be set.  Actual  tariffs  can be
below  the bound  rate, but cannot  rise above  it unless  the rate is renegotiated  with a country's  trading  partners. It
should be noted  the period  of tariff reduction  is extended  to ten years for developing  countries,  and the least
developed  countries  are not required  to make any reductions. They  are, however,  prohibited  from maintaining
nontariff  measures.
'5Minirrum  access  opportunities  are provided  when imports  of a product  subject  to tariffication  are less than
5 percent of domestic  consumption  in the 1986-88  base period. The minimum  access  opportunity  is equal to 3
percent  of the base period  consumption  in the first year, rising  to 5 percent  in six years. In the case  where  imports
of tariffied  products  exceeded  5 percent of consumption  in the base period countries  must maintain  the access
opportnity that existed  in the base period.25
price instability in international markets for agricultural goods (see Box 2 on this later point).
A narrowly defined exception has been made to the general elimination of nontariff measures.
Countries may designate certain agricultural products for  'special  treatment'  if they meet specified
criteria, thereby exempting them from the tariffication requirement. Despite the right to maintain NTBs
on designated  products, minimum access requirements will apply on these products will bring their level
of import penetration (i.e.,  the ratio of imports to consumption) from a minimum of 4 percent up to 8
percent by the end of the six-year implementation period.  In order to qualify for special treatment,
imports of designated products must comprise less than 3 percent of corresponding  domestic consumption
in the 1986-88 base period.  Second, designated products should not have benefitted from any export
subsidies since the beginning  of the base period. Third, measures restricting  domestic production should
be applied to the relevant primary agricultural product. Perhaps the most important example of a product
receiving this special treatment is rice in Japan.
B. Textiles and Clothing
Discriminatory quantitative  restrictions on imports have been prevalent in the textiles and clothing
sector for over 30 years, starting with the Short-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Textiles in 1961.  This was followed in 1962 by the Long-Term Arrangement which lasted until 1974
when the first Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) was ratified.  The current arrangement (MFA IV) runs
until December 31,  1994.  These arrangements have covered a growing number of products over the
years and have become increasingly iestrictive (Laird and Yeats, 1991).
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in the Uruguay Round provides for the elimination  of
MFA-type arrangements or, in other words, of all NTBs in the sector over a ten year period.  The phase-
out will gradually  involve the progressive elimination of quantitative restraints by product category
combined with contiminng  quota expansion (i.e.,  quotas must be expanded by not less than the amountBox 2: Nontariff Measures and International Price Stabilitv
Initial analyses of the Uruguay Round's accomplishments  relating to NTBs tend to focus on the resulting
trade gains.  This orientation  understates the importance  of what was achieved since there is reason to believe other
benefits should also result. African countries, for example, have long been concemned  with the effects of price and
eamings instability  for their major exports and imports and have been strong supporters  of measures like STABEX
and UNCTAD's Common Fund which would assist them counter the adverse effects. Related studies have shown,
however, that industrial countries' nontariff measures are an important source of this instability.  For example,
quotas and other quantitative restrictions (like VERS) make the import demand curve completely inelastic at the
point where they become operative.  As such, any shift in export supply will result in a grater price change than
that which would occur under normal demand conditions. Similarly, European countries' variable import levies --
which are widely applied to agricultural imports -- are designed to shield domestic producers from instability in
agricultural prices and earnings, but in doing so have a destabilizing influence on inernational markets.  '  Actions
taken during the Round on NTBs should reduce the importance  of the effects of international  price instability on
African economies.
Variable levies may have both an upward and downward destabilizing influence  on the products to which
they are applied. When world prices rise variable levies fall and may become negative (i.e., they become subsidies
on imports) if the world price rises above the EC's threshold price.  In this case EC import demand is higher than
under a nominal tariff.  The excess demand in an inflationary period contributes to a further increase in world
prices.  In periods when world prices are falling, however, the variable levies rise thereby restricting any increase
in demand.  Thus, through their perverse effects on  import demand variable levies destabilize world prices.
Although the EU and EFTA countries rely heavily on these measures variable levies are also used by the US and
Japan.
Aside from levies, other types of nontariff  measures are also recognized to have a destabilizing impact on
international  trade and prices.  For example, in an analysis of international  commodity  markets the OECD (1982)
compiled  the following  matrix which showed  how international  price instability  would  be affected by different NTB3s
Variance  of Price Instability  Compared to that Under Free Trade
Importing Country Measures  Exporting Country  Importing Country
Specific Tariff  same  Same
Ad Valorem Tariff  smaller  Larger
Fixed Quota  Generally Larger  Generally Larger
Proportional Quota  Generally Lar  Generally Larger
Import Prohibition  Generally Larger  Generally Larger
Price Fixing  Larger  Smaller or the Same
Variable Levy  Larger  Smaller
relative to what would occur in a free trade situation.  The importance  of this classification is highlighted by the
fact that Laird and Yeats (1990, p. 105) show that more than 70 percent of EC(10) imports of meat, cereals, dairy
products, sugar and honey, live animals, and beverages are subject to variable import levies or minimum import
pices.  Levies are also applied to over 80 percent of Japan's sugar and honey imports  while fixed quotas are applied
extensively  to Japan's  meat, dairy,  fish and cereal imports.  While attempts to quantify exact magnitudes  would be
useful,  there  is every indication that the  Uruguay Round's  tariffication'  of  NTBs will make an  important
contributions to the reduction  of global price and trade instability for agricultural products.
'Food security issues have been a major concern on many African  countries and one factor increasing  these concerns
is the wide variability  in intemational  prices for basic import staples like grains. Sampson  and Snape (1980) develop
quantitative evidence showing that OECD nontariff barriers have played an important role in increasing price
instability for these goods. This, in turn, raises the cost of food security programs.27
of quota growth during the 12 month period prior to entry into force of the agreement). Restrictions must
be removed from products accounting for not less than 16 percent in terms of  1990 volumes of items
covered by the MFA as soon as the agreement enters into force.  There are then three additional phases
that take effect at the beginning of the fourth, eighth, and end of the tenth years in which an additional
17 percent,  18 percent and 49 percent of the 1990 imnport  volumes must be fully liberalized.  Box 3
provides some indication as to how Africa may be affected by the MFA phase out.
The agreement  also establishes a "transitional  safeguard" mechanism  that allows NTBs to be used
in certain circumstances. These safeguards can be applied if increased import volumes  cause, or threaten,
serious damage to the domestic industry, and they can be maintained for a maximum of three years.
The safeguard is invoked  on a country-by-country  basis, but can only be applied on products which have
not yet been integrated into GATTIWTO rules (i.e., products on which MFA type quotas may stil  be
applied).  A second restriction on the use of the special safeguard is that it cannot be invoked on an
eligible (non-integrated)  product if that item is already subject to a MFA quota in the market concerned.
Unlike agriculture, where the removal of most NTBs will occur immediately when the agreement
enters into force, the process in the textile and clothing sector will be more gradual.  Indeed, 49 percent
of all quota restrictions by volume existing in 1990  could still be in place until the last day of the ten year
phase-out period.  Use of the transitional safeguard could also raise the coverage of NTBs above the
levels initially suggested  by the phase-out schedule. Moreover, since the MFA and its phase-out program
are built on a series of bilateral arrangements, and countries face quite different levels of restrictions, it
is difficult to make any straightforward judgements about how individual developing countries will be
affected. Indeed, the possibility exists that some aspects of the agreement may have adverse implications
for Africa unless appropriate policies are pursued  (see Box 3).*J  c;
Box 3: Implications  of the Removal of the MFA for African Countries
For over 30 years international  trade in textiles and clothing was restricted by the Multifiber Arrangement
and its predecessor the Short-Term Textile Arrangement.  These 'agreements'  established quotas on developing
countries' exports to the OECD based on pre-existing market shares.  This had positive implications for some
developing countries and negative effects on  others.  For example, developing countries that lost  their cost
competitiveness  were still able to export textiles and clothing because of the MFA quotas'  "market reservation"
effects. Countries which were new producers, or were becoming increasingly  cost competitive, found their market
shares frozen.  With few exceptions (Mauritius and Nigeria) Africa does not face MFA restrictions.  However, the
MFA probably had positive implications for African exporters in that they were shielded from direct competition
with countries that may be more competitive producers (i.e.,  China, Thailand, Sri  Lanka, etc.) due to  MFA
constraints  on the latter.
This situation will be altered dramatically  due to the Uruguay  Round. MFA quotas will be phased out over
10 years.  At this point textile trade will become subject to aggressive international  competition.  Whether Africa
can maintain  viable textile and clothing  exports will depend solely on its ability  to compete on even terms with other
producers.
Very limited information  is available  on relative costs in Africa vis-a-vis other textile producing countries,
yet the data that exists indicates Africa may have problems.  For cxample, the following shows estimates of the
direct costs (in US dollars) for the production  of a man's casual long sleeved shirt in India, the United Arab
Item  Zimbabwe  Kenya  Senegal  Gbana  India  UAE
Fabric  3.28  3.00  4.31  3.18  2.90  2.95
Misc.  Materials  0.31  0.40  0.55  0.42  0.39  0.37
Washing  0.10  O.A2  - 0.11  0.12  0.12
Labels/Packaging  0.16  0.31  0.36  0.36  0.40  0.42
Direct  & Idirect Labor  1.72  1.34  2.36  1.22  1.22  1.60
Transport  to Port  0.18  0.20  0.15  0.05  0.15  0.17
TOTAL  OF ABOVE  ITEMS  5.75  5.37  7.73  5.34  5.18  5.63
Source:  Biggs  ct. aL (1994).  The authors  report  (p. 37) that no data could be collected  for Cote d'Ivoire  because  the only
remaining  garment  exporter  was unable  to compete  for standard  shirt  export  orders. Also, the au[hors  include  a MFA  quota
cost in India's total production costs. These charges  are excluded from the above totals due to the Round's agreed phase-out of
MFA  restrictions.  It should  be noted  that  the above  cost comparisons  were made  fbr a period  prior to the CFA devaluation.
As a result  of this  exchange  rate  adjustment  Senegal's  cost  structure  is now  probably  closer to that  of the other  countries.
Emirates, and four African countries. In each case, Africa's production costs are above those for India.  Costs in
Senegal  are actually about 50 percent higher.  Ghana comes closest to matching the Indian cost stmcture, but still
are 3 percent higher.  It should be noted that the above do not incorporate  any adverse marketing and distribution
costs that may also affect Africa.
It is important to note that other Uruguay Round achievements  could have implications for Africa which
are similar to those described above.  The Round achieved agreement on the removal of all 'voluntary'  export
restraints on individual  countries that appear to have a strong comparative advantage  in the affected products.  The
removal of these VERs could significantly increase competitive pressures on  African exports of products like
footwear and ferrous metals.  This could also produce export losses.
To compete effectively in the post-Uruguay  environment Africa will need to adopt reforms that will allow
domestic  producers to be cost competitive.  These reforms must address a broad range of measres,  from the impact
of government imposed trade barriers that raise the costs of imported production inputs, to measures that limit
access to the most efficient international  sources of finance, technology, transport and communications.  Indeed,
the Uruguay Round appears to have shifted the focus for fuiher  reforms to the African countries themselves to
ensure that they can react to the new export opportunities and compeitive challenges resulting from the multilateral
trade negotiations.29
C. Safeards  and the IMplications  for 'Voluna"  Restraints
Over the years, te  GATT's safeguard  provisions have been used less frequently. This was partly
because governments preferred to seek bilateral acconunodation when addressing import competition
considered unacceptably damaging to domestic industry.  The GATT's safeguard rules permit the use
either of  import  duties or  quantitative restrictions, but require a  nondiscriminatory application of
measures and payment of compensation  through additional trade liberalization.
Voluntary export restraints,  and  similar  bilateral  arrangements involving exporters  in  the
administration of restrictions became an increasingly common approach to the protection of domestic
industries.  Exporters wished to avoid having direct (possibly more restrictive) import barriers on their
goods which could also reduce any rents associated with VERs.  Importers preferred a less transparent
protective  arrangement,  and  one  where  neither  explicit  compensation,  nor  the  constraint  of
nondiscrimination  rule, would apply."
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards seeks to provide more flexible arrangements, but
under tighter rules.  There is a relaxation  of the nondiscrimination  rule in exceptional  circumstances, and
no compensation is required during the first three years that a measure is applied.  On the other hand,
safeguards can only be applied for a limited period (four years, renewable for a further four), and cannot
be renewed  for the same time period for which they were originally  applied. In addition, safeguards must
be progressively liberalized, and are subject to surveillance and review.
The most significant feature of the safeguards agreement, however, is the commitment to eliminate
all voluntary restraints  (VERs).  All VERs, with the exception of one, are to be removed within a period
"6Another  reason why safeguard  measures  were used less frequently  may  have  been the growing  reliance  on
antidumping  and countervailing  duty actions. While  safeguard  actions  are a tacit admission  of the inability  of a
domestic  mdustry  to compete,  antidunping  and countervaiing  dutes are istuments  whose  justification  is the
counteraction  of unfair  behavior  on the part  of foreign  producers  or goverments.30
of  four  years.7 This commitnent  implies a significant reduction in nontariff measures facing all
developing countries, although the immediate  dirct  impact on African exporters, which with one or two
exceptions do not face these measures, will be limited (Africa could, however, face substantial new
competition from countries whose exports were fonnerly blocked by VERs).
V. Implications for African Exports: The Round's Effects on NTBs
The overall importance  of pre-Uruguay Round NTBs is evident from the fact that approximately
$5.9 billion of OECD imports from Africa face these measures - $4.4 billion excluding South Africa,
see the data in Table 3.  This raises the question of how the Round will influence the overall level of
nontariff protection facing sub-Saharan Africa and how will the relative importance of NTBs on different
types of export products change.  Using published details on the agreement (GATT 1994), Table 7
provides an indication  by showing the pre-Uruguay Round NTB coverage ratios for each African country
along with an estimatc of what the ratio will be after the agreement is implemented.  These estimates were
derived by tabulating the value of pre-Uruguay Round trade that will still be subject to (post-Uruguay
Round) NTBs, and then expressing this value as a share of total (pre-Uruguay Round) exports.'g  In
order to more clearly show the impact  of the Round, Table 7 classifies  countries into three groups (highly
NTB affected, moderately  affected, and largely unaffected) based on their pre-Uruguay Round coverage
'MTe  exception  of a single  measure  from  the general  phase-out  commitment  was  designed  to accommodate  the
wish of the EU to continue  to restrict  Japanese  auto imports. According  to the agreement,  however,  the single
exception  permitted  to each  party  runs only until  December  31, 1999.
Tlhe results - the post Uruguay  Round  coverage  ratio  (Cv)  - was  derived  from,
Cr  =  V.-V&
where V.  is the value of pre-Uruguay exports that will still  be subject to post-Uruguay  Round NTBs and Vb is the
total value of pre-Uruguay Round exports. This measure  probably overstates  the importance  of remaining  nontariff
barriers since the removal  of the OECD nontariff  barriers should produce a trade response. That is, African  exports
should increase as a result of the liberaization of OECD NTBs which would make the denominator in the above
expression larger, and coverage ratio smaller.  Whether African trade in textiles and clothing expands, however,
largely depends on these countries adoption of necessary measures to achieve cost competitiveness.Table 7. Pre and Post Uruguay Round NTB Coverage Ratios for Individual Sub-Saharan African Countries.
OECD Nontariff Measure Coverage Ratio
1992 OECD Imports
(S million)  All Goods  All  Non-Oil Goods
All  All Non-Oil  Pre-  Post-  Pre-  Post-
Exporter  Goods  Goods  Uruguay  Uruguay  Change  Uruguay  Uruguay  Change
HIGHLY NTB AFFECTED
Seychelles  37  37  91.4  84.7  -6.7  91.4  84.7  -6.7
Reunion  154  154  83.0  0.0  -83.0  83.0  0.0  -83.0
Mauritania  1279  1279  61.6  2.2  -59.4  61.7  2.3  -59.4
Cape Verde  7  7  39.5  0.0  -39.5  39.5  0.0  -39.5
Congo  1440  508  38.5  38.0  -0.5  3.8  2.2  -1.6
Malawi  393  393  29.6  3.7  -2  29.6  3.7  -25.9
Cameroon  1577  814  20.8  19.7  -1.1  3.7  1.6  -2.1
Zimbabwe  875  875  20.3  6.9  -13.4  20.5  7.1  -13.4
MODERATELY  NTB AFFECTED
Senegal  362  357  19.1  0.0  -19.1  19.1  0.0  -19.1
Sao Tome & Principe  5  5  17.2  2.7  -14.5  17.5  3.0  -14.5
Gabon  2119  458  15.8  15.8  0.0  1.5  1.5  0.0
Nigeria  11379  497  14.4  14.4  0.0  1.0  0.9  -0.1
Cote d' Ivoire  2258  2223  14.1  1.5  -12.6  14.4  1.6  -12.8
South Africa  11132  9490  13.0  3.7  -9.3  11.5  0.6  -10.9
Sudan  149  149  12.4  4.1  -8.3  12.4  4.1  -8.3
Burkina  Faso  53  53  12.3  0.0  -12.3  12.3  0.0  -12.3
Mozambique  147  147  10.3  0.6  -9.7  10.3  0.6  -9.7
Somalia  19  19  9.0  0.0  -9.0  9.0  0.0  -9.0
Madagascar  340  340  7.6  2.9  -4.7  7.6  2.9  -4.7
Djibouti  4  3  5.2  5.2  0.0  5.2  5.2  0.0
Angola  3684  219  4.7  4.7  0.0  1.2  0.8  -0.4
Tanzania  266  266  3.8  0.5  -3.3  4.1  0.8  -3.3
Kenya  837  833  3.5  0.3  -3.2  3.5  0.3  -3.2Table 7. Continued
OECD  Nontariff  Measure  Coverage  Ratio
1992  OECD  Imports
(S  million)  All Goods  All Non-Oil  Goods
All  All  Non-Oil  Pre-  Post-  Pre-  Post-
Exporter  Goods  Goods  Uruguay  Uruguay  Change  Uruguay  Uruguay  Change
NTB  UNAFFECTED  COUNTRES
Ethiopia  160  160  1.8  1.2  40.6  1.8  1.2  -0.6
Mauritania  413  413  1.3  1.0  -0.3  0.3  0.0  -0.3
Guinea  Bissau  8  8  1.3  0.2  -1.2  1.6  0.5  -1.2
Benin  76  66  1.3  0.3  -1.0  1.5  0.3  -1.2
Rwanda  64  64  1.1  0.2  .0.9  1.1  0.2  -0.9
Zambia  630  630  0.7  0.0  -0.7  0.7  0.0  -0.7
Comoros  28  28  0.6  0.6  0.0  0.6  0.6  0.0
Gambia  183  183  0.5  0.3  .0.2  0.5  0.3  -0.2
Togo  121  118  0.5  0.1  -0.4  0.5  0.1  -0.4
Ghana  886  872  0.4  0.2  40.2  0.2  0.0  -0.2
Mali  117  117  0.4  0.2  -0.2  0.4  0.2  -0.2
Guinea  526  526  0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.3  0.1  -0.2
Niger  184  184  0.2  0.1  -0.1  0.2  0.1  .0.1
Burundi  74  74  0.1  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1
Chad  66  66  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0
Central  African  Rep.  102  102  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0
Equatorial  Guinea  39  39  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.0
Sierra  Leone  354  354  0.1  0.0  .0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1
Uganda  162  162  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Zaire  1277  1126  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Liberia  804  720  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Sub-Saharan  Africa  44791  25137  13.1  8.0  -5.1  10.8  3.3  -7.5
Source:  NTB  information  from World  Bank-UNCTAD  SMART  Database.  Trade  data  from  UN COMTRADE  Records.33
ratios.
For several  countries  the estimated  change  in the nontariff  barrier coverage  ratios  are dramatic.
Prior to the Uruguay  Round, 83 percent of Reunion's  exports (which consist  largely  of sugar) faced
OECD  restrictions  while this ratio should  fall to zero  as a result of the agreement. The coverage  ratio
for Mauritius  should  decline  by almost  60 percentage  points (to just over 2 percent)  after textile  and
clothing  restrictions  are lifted  from this  countries'  exports,  while the tariffication  of agricultural  NTBs
causes  Cape  Verde's ratio  to decline  from about  40 percent  to zero.  Overall,  the share  of Africa's  non-
oil exports  that face nontariff  barriers  should  decline  from approximately  II to about  3 percent."9  This
implies  that  about  $2 billion  of Africa's  exports  that  formerly  faced  restrictions  will  no longer  be covered.
Figure  2 presents  another  prospective  on the impact  of the Round  by showing  how it altered  the
overall  profile  of nontariff  protection  facing  Africa.  The top most line Nb ranks African countries  in
terms  of increasing  pre-Uruguay  Round  NTB  coverage  ratios  (the ratios  increase  as one  moves  rightward
along  the horizontal  scale),  while  the lower  line  (N) indicates  what  the esimated coverage  ratio  for each
country  will  be after the Round. Acal  values  of NTB  coverage  ratios  are recorded  on the vertical  axis.
This presentation  suggest  that African  countries  could  be classified  in three groups  as far as the
Uruguay  Round  results are concerned. Those in the left side of the figure (like Burundi, Ethiopia,
Gambia or Mali) had very low coverage  ratios before the Round so these countries' direct export
prospects  could  not be much  improved. The do have  the potential,  however,  of being  adversely  affected
by more aggressive  conpletion  with exporters  who  were formerly  restricted  by the MFA Agreement  or
by "voluntary"  export restraints  (see Box 3).  Second, the right hand side of the Figure identifies
countries  like  Reunion  and Mauritius  which  previously  had high NTB ratios that will fall dramatically
due to the Round. These countries  may have  significant  new export  opporunities,  although  they too
'Me  estimated  post-Uruguay  Round  coverage  ratio is probably  and overtimate  since  it does  not account  for
the trade  response  that should  accompany  the removal  of NTBs.  That is, exports  of some  previously  NTB affected
products  will increase  which  would  reduce  the share  of products  stll facing  these  restrictions.Figure 2: Illustration of the Impact of the Uruguay Round  on the
Profile of Nontariff Protection  Facing  African Countries














Afr  ia  n  Ciou  M  X Tr  o  In|ain  P  N  C  Rat
African Countries  Ranked  in Terms  of Increasing  Pro-Uruguay  NTB Coverage  Ratio35
should  prepare  for more aggressive  international  competition.  Between  these  two groups  are a number
of countries  like Nigeria, Congo, Gabon or the Seychelles  with relatively  high pre-Uruguay  NTB
ratiosthat  were largely unaffected  by the UR agreement. In most cases, the failure of the Round  to
liberalize  restrictions  on energy  products  account  for these  results  (as noted, the exclusion  of fish  explains
the high post-Uruguay  ratios for the Seychelles  and a few other countries.  However,  even with these
exceptions  Figure  2, shows  the Round  had a major  impact  in lowering  nontariff  protection  facing  Africa.
VII. Summav Conclusions  and 'Unfinished"  Business
Perhaps  the major  accomplishment  of the Uruguay  Round  relates  to agreements  that  were  reached
on nontariff  barriers.  All NTBs  imposed  under the Multifiber  Arrangement  (MFA)  will be phased  out
over a ten year period as will all 'voluntary' export restraints. (ECD countries'  nontariff  barriers  on
agricultural  goods  will be converted  to tariffs  and then  reduced  by an average  of 36 percent. Agreement
was also reached  on limiting  subsidies  and other incentives  to support  agricultural  exports.
These  achievements  will  markedly  change  the profile  of OECD  nontariff  protection  facing  Africa.
Formerly,  about 11 percent  of sub-Saharan  Africa's non-fuel  exports faced  NTBs  - this ratio will fall
to about 3 percent because  of the Uruguay  Round.  For some African  countries  the changes  will be
dramatic. Pre-Uruguay  Round  NTBs covered  more than 60 percent  of Mauritius' exports  - this ratio
will fall to about  2 percent  as a result  of the Round. Formerly,  83 percent of Reunion's  exports  faced
NTBs and this ratio will drop to zero. However,  some  African  countries  will be largely  unaffected  by
the Uruguay  Round's  accomplishments.  No NTBs  on energy  products  were liberalized  so the coverage
ratios  for countries  like  Angola,  Congo  and Nigeria  will remain  relatively  high. Exclusion  of fish from
the Round's agreement  on agriculture  limited  the benefits  to countries  like  the Seychelles  that specialize
in these exports. Others  simply  faced no (or few) nontariff  restrictions  prior to the trade negotiations.36
While there Is a (correct) tendency  to regard these developments  as being positive from the
viewpoint  of all developing  countries  as a group,  some  may incur  losses. Trade in textiles  and  clothing
has been rigidly  controlled  over the last three decades  through  the use of quotas imposed  undcr the
Multifiber  Arrangement.  The phase  out of these restrictions  over a 10 year period will subject  African
exports  to aggressive  international  competition. The ability of many African  countries  to maintain  a
viable  textile  and clothing  export sector  depends  on their  capacity  to implement  necessary  reforms  aimed
at achieving  cost competitiveness.  The fact  that  the MFA  liberalization  is so heavily  backloaded  (roughly
one-half  of the restrictions  will be removed  at the end of a ten year period)  provides  ample time for
adjustments  to be implemented.  In any event, losses  of market  share for textiles  and ;iothing  need  not
be an accurate indication  as to the impact  on welfare  - particularly  if African exports are heavily
subsidized. Africa  should  also face more  vigorous  competition  on products  like footwear  and ferrous
metals, where  exports from some other developing  countries  were formerly  restrained  by 'voluntary'
restraints  whid, were eliminated  by the Round.
Some of the Uruguay  Round's  effects in agriculture  could also be potentially  negative  unless
appropriate  domestic  policies  are adopted. The tariffication  (and reduction)  of NTBs, along  with limits
on export  subsidies,  could  raise international  prices  of some  important  staples  which  could  have  adverse
effects  on African  net food importers. Refonrs to ensure that  prices paid donestic producers  increase
in line  with international  prices (thereby  stimulating  a local cupply  response)  could  limit  increases  in the
food import  bill.  The removal  any domestic  constraints  that prevent local producers  from taking full
advantage  of new export opportunities  has clearly  assumed  increased  importance  in the post-Uruguay
Round  world.
As far as  'unfinished"  business  is concerned,  furtffier  initiatives  are needed to address NTBs
facing energy  products,  fish and chemicals  since  these  were largely  bypassed  by the Round. Since  little
information  is now available  on their trade impact, efforts should be made to estimate the levels of37
protection  afforded  by the post-Uruguay  NTBs  (as was  done previously  in the "tariffication"  exercise  for
agriculture). These NTB  nominal  equivalents  could  be helpful  in establishing  priority  sectors for post-
Uruguay  Round  action. Also, there is a need  for stricter regulations  on the use of OECD  antidumping
duties and safeguards  to ensure that these forms of protection  are not substituted  for those  that were
eliminated. However,  a very large part of the unfinished  business  involves  reforms  in the African
countries  themselves  to ensure  they  can react to the new  export  opportunities  and competitive  challenges
resulting  from the Uruguay  Round.38
Refences
Anjaria, S. Z.  Iqbal, N.  Kirmani and L.  Perez (1982). Developments in International Trade
Policy, (Washington: International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 16).
Avramovic, Dragaslov (1978). "Common Fund, Why and What Kind," Journal of World Trade
law,  12(October).
Bain, Joe (1951).  "Relation of Profit to Industry Concentration," Review of Economics and
Statistics, 33 (May).
Balassa, Bela (1977). 'Export Incentives and Economic Performance in Developing Countries,"
World Bank Staff Working Paper 248, (Washington: World Bank).
Balassa, Bela (1984).  'Adjusting to External Shocks in Developing Economies,"  World Bank
Staff Working Paper 472, (Washington: World Bank)
Bell Frederick and  Neil  Murphy (1969).  "Impact of  Market  Structure on  the Price  of  a
Comnmercial  Banking Service,'  Review of Economics and Statistics, 51(May).
Biggs, Tyler, Gail Moody, Jan-Hendrik van Laeuwen and E. Diane White (1994). Africa Can
Compete! ExDort Opportunities and Challenges for Garnents  and Home Products in the U.S. Market,
(Washington: World Bank, March).
Boltuck, Richard and Robert E. Litan (eds.) (1991).  Down in the Dungs: Administration  of the
Unfair Trade Laws, (Washington: The Brookings Institution).
Cline, William, Noburu Kawanabe, T.O.M.  Kronsjo and Thomas Williams (1978).  Trade
Negotiations in the Tokyo Round: A Ouantitative Assessment, (Washington: The Brookings  Institution).
Comnnonwealth  Secretariat (1982).  Protectionism: Threat to  International Order,  (London:
Commonwealth  Secretariat)
Edwards,  Corwin  (1972).  "Barriers  to  International Competition:  Interfirm  Conmpetitive
Behavior," in R. Hawkins and I. Walter (eds.), The United States and Intemational Markets, (Lexington:
D.C. Heath).
Erzan, Refik and Peter Svedberg (1991). "Protection Facing Exports from Sub-Saharan Africa
in the EC, Japan and the US," in Jonathan Frimpong-Ansah, Ravi Kanbur and Peter Svedberg (eds.),
Trade and Development in Sub-Sabaran Africa, (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
Finger, J. Michael (ed.) (1993). Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt, (Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press).
GATT (1994). Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, (Marrakesh: GATT, 30 March).
Helleiner, G.K. (1972).  International Trade and Economic Develo ment, (Middlesex: Penguin39
Books, 1972).
Helleiner, G.K.  (1978). World Market Imperfections and Developing Countries, (Washington:
Overseas Development Council).
Keesing,  Donald  (1967).  "Outward Looking Policies and  Economic Development," The
Economic Journal, vol. 77, (June), pp. 303-320.
Kravis, Irving (1970).  "Trade as a Handmaiden of Growth: Similarities Between the Nineteenth
and Twentieth Centuries," The Economic  Joumal, vol. 80, (December), pp. 850-872.
Laird, Sam and Alexander Yeats (1990). Ouantitative Methods for Trade Barrier Analysis,
(London: Macmillan Press).
Little, Ian, Tibor Scitovsky and Maurice Scott (1970). Industry and Trade in Some Developing
Countries, (London: Oxford University Press).
Mann, H.M.  (1966). "Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty
Industries," Review of Economics and Statistics, 48(August).
Meier, Gerald (1968).  The Intemational Economics of Development, (New York: Harper and
Row).
Messerlin,  Patrick (1989). "The EC Antidumping Regulations: A First Economic Appraisal
(1980-85), Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, Band 125. Heft 3.
OECD (1982).  Problems of Agricultural Protectionism, (Paris: OECD).
OECD (1987). National Policies and Agricultural Trade:  Study on the European Econornic
Community, (Paris: OECD).
Sampson, Gary and Richard Snape (1980). "Effects of the EEC's  Variable Levies," Journal of
Political Economy, 88(October).
Sampson, Gary and Alexander Yeats (1977). "An Evaluation of the Conunon Agricultral  Policy
as a Barrier Facing Agricultural Exports to the European Economic Community,"  American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, (February).
Saxon,  Eric  and  Kym Anderson (1982).  "Japanese Agricultural Protection  in  a  Historical
Perspective," Pacific Economic Papers No. 92, (Canberra: Australian National University, July)
Tharakan, P.K.M.  (ed.)(1991).  PoliCY  Imlications  of Antidum=ing Measures, (Amsterdam:
North Holland).
UNCTAD (1992). Handbook of Intemational Trade and Development Statistics, (New York:
United Nations.40
UNCTAD  (1993).  Trade and De)veloment  Rport.  1993,  (New York: United  Nations).
UN Food and Agricultural  Organization  (1979). Commodity  Review  and Outlook. 1979-198,
(Rome:  FAO)
Varangis,  Panayotis,  Carlos  A. Primo-Braga  and  Kenji  Takeuchi  (1993).  "Tropical  Timber  Trade
Policies:  What  Inpact Will  Eco-Labelling  Have?,' World  Bank  Policy  Research  Workinag  Paver Number
1156, (Washington:  World Bank,  July).
World  Bank  (1986).  World Dcv  om  Repot. 196, (New  York: Oxford  University  Press  for
the World  Bank).
Yeats, Alexander  (1979). Trade Barriers Facim Deveoping Countries,  (London:  Macmillan
Press).
Yeats, Alexander  (1981). Trade and Develo,ment:  Leadina Issues for the 1980s, (London:
MacMillan Press).
Yeats,  Alexander  (1994). -What  Are  OECD  Preferences  Worth  to Subharan  Africa?"  World
Bank  Policy  Research  Workin Paper 1254,  (Washington:  World  Bank).Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1  425 On the Intersectoral  Migration of  Donald  Larson  February  1995  J. Jacobson
Agrcultural Labor  Yair Mundlak  33710
WPS1426 Russian Unemployment.  Its  Simon  Commander  February  1995  V. Reid
Magnitude,  Characteristics,  and  Ruslan Yemtsov  35195
Regional  Dimensions
WPS1427 Corporate  Governance  and Equity  Stijn Claessens  February  1995  F. Hatab
Prices: Evidence  from the Czech  35835
and Slovak Republics
WPS1428 Short-Term  Supply  Response  to a  Bruno Boccara  February  1995  M. Pfeiffenberger
Devaluation:  A Model  s Implications  Fabien  Nsengiyumva  34963
for Primary  Commodity-Exporting
Developing  Countries
WPS1429 The World  Trade Organization's  Bemard  M. Hoekman  March  1995  F. Hatab
Agreement  on Govemment  Petros  C. Mavroidis  38535
Procurement:  Expanding  Disciplines,
Declining  Membership?
WPS1430 Intergovemmental  Fiscal Relations  Richard  M. Bird  March 1995  G. Coward
and Poverty  Alleviation  in Viet Nam  Jennie I. Utvack  80494
M. Govinda  Rao
WPS1431 The Industrial  Pollution  Projection  Hemamala  Hettige  March 1995  A. Williams
System  Paul Martin  37176
Manjula  Singh
David  Wheeler
WPS1432 Using Financial  Futures  in Trading  Ignacio Mas  March 1995  K. Binkley
and Risk Management  Jesiis Sac-Requejo  81143
WPS1433 Enterprise Restructuring  in Eastem  Bemard Hoekman  March 1995  F. Hatab
Europe:  How Much?  How Fast?  Gerhard  Pohl  35835
Where? Preliminary  Evidence  from
Trade Data
WPS1434 Govemment  Credit  Policy and  Charles  W. Calomiris  March 1995  P. Infante
Industrial Performance  (Japanese  Charles  P. Himmelberg  37642
Machine  Tool Producers,  1963-S91)
WPS1435 The Political  Economy  of Formal  Arup Banerji  March 1995  0. Evans
Sector Pay  and Employment  in  J. Edgardo  Campos  37496
Developing  Countries  Richard  H. Sabot
WPS1436 An Empirical  Model  of Sunk  Costs  Mark  J. Roberts  March1995  J. Ngaine
and  the Decision  to Export  James R. Tybout  37959Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Thile  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS1437  Travel  Made  Substitulion  In  S&o  Jotfre  Swalt  March  1995  C. Jones
Paulo:  Estimates  and  Implications  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  37699
for Air  Pollution  Control
WPS1438  Trade  Reform,  Efficiency,  and  Growth Ejaz  Ghani  March  1995  A. NokhosUln
Cad  Jayarajah  34150
WPS1439  Nontarifl  Barriers  Africa  Faces:  What  Azita  Amiadi  March  1995  S. Upscomb
Did  the  Uruguay  Round  Accomplish, Alexander  Yeats  33718
and  What  Remains  to Be  Done?
WPS1440  Poverty  and  Social  Transfers  in  Chdstiaan  Grootaert  March  1995  N. Sachdeva
Poland  871 7